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Covenants Running with the Land, and
Equitable Servitudes; Two Concepts, or One?
By RALPH A. NEWMAN*
AND
FRANK R. LosEy**
B RONOWSKI tells of the difficulty experienced by Sherpas who
habitually approach Mt. Everest from opposite sides, in realizing that
the two sides are faces of the same mountain.1 The classification of re-
strictions on the use of land into convenants running with the land at
law, and equitable servitudes, is a striking example of what Julius Stone
has called categories of meaningless reference;2 two descriptions of the
same concept.
Holmes felt that the doctrine of covenants running with the land
originated in implied warranties of title, which were enforceable since
very early times by heirs and assigns of the covenantee. 8 The running
of the benefit of a covenant restricting the use of land has been recog-
nized since as early as the 13th century.4 Sims thought that the closest
analogy was to express warranties.5 Other modem writers have stressed
the analogy to the running of easements-' Support for the doctrine of
the running of covenants in deeds was provided by the analogy of the
running of covenants in leases, enforced at common law for and against
assignees of the lessee7 and also, after 1540, by virtue of chapter 34
of 32 Henry VIII, for and against grantees of the lessor. The cove-
nants do not, of course, travel with each successive transfer of the land,
but the successor in estate moves, with reference to the covenant, into
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
** Third year student, Hastings College of the Law.
1. J. BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALuEs 29-30 (rev. ed. 1965).
2. J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEMS AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 339 (1964).
3. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 371 (1881).
4. Gifford v. Willeby, Y.B. 21 & 22 Edw. 1, f. 136 (Rolls ed. 1293).
5. Sims, The Law of Real Covenants: Exceptions to the Restatement of the
Subject by the American Law Institute, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 (1944) [hereinafter cited
as Sims].
6. See, e.g., H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 861, n.73 (3d ed. 1939) [hereinafter
cited as TIFFANY].
7. BROOKE'S ABRIDMENT, COVENANT 32 (1573).
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the position of his predecessor in title. The running of covenants is a
departure from the basic concept of contract law which precludes the
devolution of contractual obligations without consent to the assumption
of the obligation.8
In 1848 Lord Cottenham was faced with the problem, in Tulk v.
Moxhay,9 of whether a covenant could run in equity which was not of
the kind that could run at common law. In that case the owner of land
in Leicester Square conveyed the land subject to an agreement by the
grantee to keep the park open for the use of tenants of adjoining prop-
erty of the grantor. The purchaser was also to keep the park orderly
and to maintain the fences. The deed to the defendant, who acquired
the park through mesne conveyances, did not contain any similar
covenants, but the defendant knew of the agreement. The original
vendor then sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from vio-
lating the covenants in the prior deed. Negative easements were limited
in English law to light, air, support and the flow of artificial streams.10
Frequent expressions of judicial opinion had closed the category of
incidents which could be attached to real property in the form of af-
firmative easements," and a right to roam at will, such as was reserved
for the grantor's tenants who lived in the neighborhood of the park,
was not sufficiently definite to fall within the traditional classification of
an easement.' 2 In 1848 the question of whether the burden of restric-
tive covenants could run had not been definitely decided. Early cases
had assumed that they could run,'" but this doctrine had been repeat-
edly disapproved in dicta,' 4 although it was not until nearly forty
years after Tulk v. Moxhay that there was an actual decision that, except
in the case of leases, the burden could not run.' 5 According to accepted
8. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.26 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); C. CLARK,
REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 113 (2d ed. 1947)
[hereinafter cited as CLARK]; 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 340-41 (1881).
9. 40 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). The same problem had arisen a few years
earlier in Whatman v. Gibson, 59 Eng. Rep. 333 (Ch. 1838), and had been decided
the same way.
10. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.24 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
11. See Conard, An Analysis of Licenses in Land, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
826 (1942); Conard, Easement Novelties, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 124, 126 (1941).
12. See In re Ellenborough Park, [1956] 1 Ch. 131.
13. See CLARK, supra note 8, at 103-07.
14. See the authorities cited in C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS
WHICH "RUN WITH LAND," INCLUDING LICENSES, EASEMENTS, PROFITS, EQUITABLE RE-
STRICTIONS AND RENTS 113, 146, 158 (1929); CLARK, supra note 8, at 231 n.62; 4 J.
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1295 (5th ed. 1941); Clark, The Doctrine of
Privity of Estate in Connection with Real Covenants, 32 YALE L.J. 123, 140 (1922).
15. Austerbury v. Oldham, 29 Ch. D. 750 (C.A. 1885). See TIFFANY, supra
note 6, § 7.75; Sims, supra note 5, at 28.
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doctrine the prohibition of the running of burdens would bar relief.
Lord Cottenham, trained in the Blackstonean tradition that the common
law was a closed system,16 relied on the power of equity to provide for
situations not covered by the rules of common law and granted an in-
junction, on the circular reasoning that a purchaser who knew of a re-
striction when he purchased the property would be unjustly enriched if
he could resell it free from the restriction imposed in the prior con-
veyance. This would depend, of course, as Stone has pointed out, on
whether the putative restriction had entered into the calculation of the
price paid for the property.17  In effect what Lord Cottenham did was
correct the injustice of permitting a purchaser who had known of a re-
striction to ignore it. The decision has been interpreted in the United
States, with what may have been unnecessary formalism with regard
to the distinction between law and equity, as having created a new
category of restrictions, those which are enforceable in equity even in
the absence of a community of property interests between the parties
to the covenant. This separation of restrictive covenants into two
categories has led to considerable uncertainty in their enforcement. The
uncertainty is due to three factors: the use of the concept of privity in dif-
ferent senses; the dual effect of restrictive covenants in creating a per-
sonal liability in contract and a property interest in the land which is
affected by the restriction; and, perhaps the most important reason for
the uncertainty which surrounds this area of property law, the introduc-
tion of a new category of restrictions which, although created by per-
sons who had no mutual interest in the affected land and between whom
there was for that reason no privity of estate, bind the land in the own-
ership of persons who were not parties to the original agreement. The
law has not succeeded in integrating the new doctrine into existing
legal institutions. There are not in reality two categories of restrictions;
there are only restrictions, carrying somewhat different jural conse-
quences depending on whether the restriction was created orally or in
writing, and, occasionally, on the relationship of the parties to the af-
fected property. The more fundamental differences in the consequences
result from a misconception of the nature and purpose of the concept of
privity of estate. The overall problem may be divided for purposes of
analysis into problems of creation and enforcement.
16. See Ames, The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 H~iv. L. Rnv. 261, 270 (1908).
17. Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract, 18
CoLTum. L. REv. 291, 299 (1918).
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I. Problems Connected with the Creation of Restrictions
A. Privity
(1) The English Treatment of Privity
In England it is well settled that the requirement of a mutual, con-
tinuing property interest other than that created by the covenant itself,
to enable the burden of the restriction to run, is dispensed with in
equity.' 8 At law the burden of a covenant does not run except in the
relationship of lessor and lessee.' 9 The question of privity of estate
is therefore irrelevant in actions for damages, since even if privity
resulting from an easement or a reversionary interest other than that
arising out of the lessor and lessee relationship were present, the burden
could not run. The injustice of permitting a person who purchased
property with knowledge of a restriction to ignore the rights of the
property owner who was entitled to the benefit, led the English Court of
Chancery to enforce the restriction by injunction, a form of remedy
peculiar to that court. In equity, negative restrictions, in which the
burden runs, create a property interest running not with an estate in
the land but with the servient land itself, and the question of privity
does not arise.2" The equitable doctrine of the running of the burden
has not been applied, in actions for damages, even since the abolition
the Court of Chancery. The difference in the treatment of covenants
at law and in equity was probably inevitable when law and equity were
administered in separate courts. Since the abolition of separate courts
of equity the disparity of treatment of covenants at law and in equity
is no longer necessary, but is perpetuated by the weight of history.
(2) The American Doctrine of Privity
Since restrictions on the use of land are created by contract and the
obligations of a contract cannot be assigned without consent to the
assumption of the obligation, justification for the enforcement of the
obligation against subsequent acquirers of the land had to be supplied
from some source other than contract law. The justification has been
found in the law of property, in which easements or other property in-
18. Morland v. Cook, L.R. 6 Eq. 252 (Ch. 1868); Coles v. Sims, 43 Eng. Rep.
768 (Ch. 1854); Tulk v. Moxhay, 40 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848); Whatman v. Gibson,
59 Eng. Rep. 333 (Ch. 1838); G. CHESHIRE, THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
550 (10th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CHEsHIRE].
19. Rogers v. Hosegood, [1900] 2 Ch. 388, 395 (privity by deed rejected). See
generally CHESHIRE, supra note 18, at 536.
20. See Ellison v. Reacher, [1908] 2 Ch. 374, 385; CHESHIRE, supra note 18, at
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terests, although of an incorporeal nature, constitute rights in rem in
favor of the owner of the interest. The requirement of privity of
estate thus provides doctrinal support for the running of the burden of
restrictions. 2' From a utilitarian point of view the requirement provides
a control over the random accumulation of encumbrances which would
be of no lasting social utility. In former times the usual purpose of re-
strictive covenants was to protect a residence to be retained in the
family of the grantor. In modem land use planning, the purpose of re-
strictions is to protect communities of purchasers in developments af-
fecting many people. The modem restrictions enhance, rather than
impair, the alienability of land, and the need for such controls over the
proliferation of restrictions has disappeared.
Tiffany has pointed out that although judicial statements are to
be found expressing the view that new types of easements will not be
recognized, courts "have quite freely allowed incidents of a novel kind
to be attached to property in the form of easements, as they have of
covenants. 22 It was therefore unnecessary, as Sims noted,I for Ameri-
can courts to establish a new category of restrictions which can be en-
forced only in the exclusive equitable jurisdiction. Restrictions which
are not enforceable as covenants running with the land at law have been
classified, however, as equitable servitudes; the distinction turning on
whether they were created orally or in writing, and on whether or
not privity was present. In suits for injunctions, courts have found
no need for a doctrinal justification for the enforcement of the restric-
tion against a subsequent owner who had not been a party to the
agreement by which the restriction was created. If a doctrinal explana-
tion of the succession of liability were needed to support the running of
the restriction at law, it could be readily supplied by recognizing the
covenant itself, as the English have done, as a property interest. This is
the view of the nature of such restrictions favored by many authorities, 24
rendering superfluous any other form of privity of estate.
For either rights or obligations of any contract to run in favor of or
against persons who were not parties to the contract, there must of
course be privity in the sense of succession to the interest of the promisor
or the promisee, as the case may be.25 To provide a means for support-
21. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTy § 9.26 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); R. POUND,
THE SPntrr OF TaE COMMON LAW 23 (1921); Clark, Privity of Estate, 32 YALE LJ.
123, 133 (1922).
22. TIFFANY, supra note 6, § 775.
23. Sims, supra note 5, at 19.
24. See note 102 infra.
25. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 403-04 (1881). The devolution of the
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ing the running of the obligation in covenants restricting the use of
land, privity of another kind, called privity of estate, has been required.26
In Massachusetts this kind of privity has to be supported by the presence
of a continuing mutual interest, on the analogy of tenurial privity, simi-
lar to the English doctrine which confines the running of the burden at
law to the relationship of lessor and lessee.2 7 In the United States the
term privity of estate has been used in some states in still a third sense,
that of succession in interest, not between the covenantee and his suc-
cessors in interest or between the covenantor and his successors in in-
terest, but between the covenantee and the covenantor, a succession cre-
ated by the conveyance of the property to which the burden is to attach,
or which is to benefit from a burden on property retained by the grantor.
In England until 1290, the date of Quia Emptores, a feoffment created
tenurial privity between the feoffor and the feoffee, even in the case of
feoffments in fee simple absolute. Since that date a conveyance of a fee
has not created any continuing interest which might constitute a tie be-
tween the properties and enable a restrictive covenant to run with the
land. Privity supposedly created by a conveyance constitutes moreover
no control over the proliferation of restrictions, since this is the way in
which such restrictions are normally established. This third conception
of privity confuses the reasons for requiring succession of estate between
the covenantee and his assigns and between the covenantor and his
assigns, on the one hand, and a continuing relationship between the
covenantee and the covenantor and their respective assigns, on the
other. Transfer by deed establishes the necessary connection be-
tween the covenantee and the plaintiff, and the covenantor and
the defendant, on each side of the covenant, by treating the sub-
sequent conveyance of the benefited land as an assignment, and of the
burdened land as an assumption, of the respective rights and obliga-
tions; but it provides no privity in the sense of a continuing relationship
between the covenantee and the covenantor or their respective assigns.
The doctrine of privity by deed is merely an empty shell without sig-
nificance in providing a doctrinal explanation of the succession of lia-
burden of the covenant requires a succession to the covenantor's interest in the
land. CLARK, supra note 8, at 115.
26. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 409 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); R. POtmD, THE
SPIRmT OF THE COMMON LAW 23 (1921).
27. Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885); Morse v. Aldrich, 36
Mass. (19 Pick.) 449 (1837); see Bronson v. Brown, 108 Mass. 175 (1871), where a
covenant to maintain a fence was held to operate as an easement to which a covenant
may attach. It seems probable that the Massachusetts requirement will be followed
in Rhode Island. See Middletown v. Newport Hosp., 16 R.I. 319, 15 A. 800 (1888).
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bility. In the United States privity by deed, sometimes called instan-
taneous privity,28 is deemed sufficient, in a few jurisdictions where
privity of estate is required, to support an action for damages. 29 De-
spite occasional judicial affirmation of the doctrine and some uncritical
acceptance by textwriters,30 it does not represent the actual state of the
law.31
Neither the doctrinal nor utilitarian purpose of the requirement of
privity of estate depends on the relation between the parties, the ap-
proach which some courts have taken in requiring that the restrictions, to
run with the land at law, must be created (in the absence of a reversion,
an easement or the relationship of lessor and lessee) by a deed convey-
ing the property. Privity depends on the nature of the agreement and
the relation of the agreement to the land. It is what the covenant con-
tains, not the way it has been created, or the way it is to be enforced,
whether in damages or by injunction, which is significant from either
the doctrinal or the utilitarian point of view. This is true of agreements
between landowners as well as when an easement or a reversionary in-
terest is present, or when the covenant is contained in a deed transferring
title.
The Restatement of Property establishes different criteria of privity
depending on whether the burden or the benefit is intended to run. Sec-
tion 534 requires, for a promise to bind successor owners, an easement
held by one party in the land of the other, or that the promise must be
part of a transfer of an interest in the land which is benefited or bur-
dened; that is, the running of the burden requires one of these two
kinds of privity. In the running of the benefit the Restatement dis-
penses, in section 548, with both tests; neither kind of privity is re-
quired. Section 542 of the Restatement provides that only succession
to the ownership of the land of the person initially entitled to the benefit
is necessary to support the running of the benefit. In addition, section
537 requires that, for the burden to run, it must bear a reasonable rela-
tion to the benefit. This latter requirement has been criticized on the
ground that the fact may not be determined until long after the covenant
was made, that the test is indefinite, and that it is wholly without au-
thority save for occasional dicta. 82
28. The term "instantaneous privity" is used in 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRopERTY
368 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952).
29. See cases cited note 46 infra.
30. See, e.g., Reno, Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 VA. L. Rrv. 968, nn.
74-77 (1942); Sims, supra note 5.
31. TIFFANY, supra note 6, § 389. The authorities are equally divided. See notes
44-50 infra.
32. CLAP, supra note 8, at 220.
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A possible explanation of the importance attributed to the incor-
poration of the restriction in a deed transferring title is that this is almost
always the way the agreement is made. The acceptance of a deed con-
taining the covenant is equivalent to an express agreement on the part
of the grantee to perform. 3 Without the deed there would be
no agreement. Another reason, expressed in a New Hampshire case,34
is the analogy to covenants of title. The New Hampshire court quoted
Judge Denio, in Van Rensselaer v. Hayes, who had said that "there is
a certain privity between the grantor and grantee of the land . . . the
same sort of privity which enables the grantee of a purchaser to main-
tain an action upon the covenants of title."3' 5 The analogy is imper-
fect, however, because the running of the covenant of title is supported
on the ground that otherwise, as Kent has pointed out,36 the covenantor
would never be subjected to substantial damages if the covenantee sold
the property before his possession had been disturbed by the holder of
a paramount title, and a subsequent owner who suffered harm by the
breach of the covenant could never recover damages against the cove-
nantor. These reasons have no applicability to restrictions on the use
of land because such restrictions are enforceable by injunctive relief.
Moreover, covenants of title are necessarily in deeds. The deed is
significant in either situation only because it contains the covenant.
The origin of the doctrine of privity by deed has been described by
Judge Clark as of "dubious historicity.' '37 He cites cases from the Year
Books in which the benefits ran at law without a grant between the
parties.38 There is no mention of the requirement of privity in Spencer's
Case,39 generally regarded as the fountainhead of the doctrine. The
annotation of that case in Smith's Leading Cases, which states that there
must be a deed to establish the relationship of privity, in the absence of
tenurial privity, between the covenantor and the covenantee, cites as the
earliest authority Webb v. Russell,40 a case decided two hundred years
33. Fort Dodge, D.M. & S. Ry. v. American Community Stores Corp., 256 Iowa
1344, 131 N.W.2d 515 (1964); Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 364, 113 N.W. 941,
944 (1907); Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N.H. 475 (1869); TIFFANY, supra note 6, § 848.
34. Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N.H. 475, 479 (1869).
35. 19 N.Y. 68, 91 (1859).
36. 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 472 (14th ed. 1896).
37. See 165 Broadway Bldg., Inc. v. City Inv. Co., 120 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir.
1951); CLARK, supra note 8, at 115-21; see 0. HOLMES, TIE COMMON LAW 404
(1881). Pound regards the requirement of privity by deed as an American innova-
tion. R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 23 (1921). The earliest American
use of the concept is in Dunbar v. Juniper, 2 Yeates 74 (Pa. 1796).
38. See CLARK, supra note 8, at 121 n.85, 124 n.96.
39. 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q.B. 1583).
40. 100 Eng. Rep. 639 (K.B. 1789).
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after Spencer's Case. In Webb v. Russell privity was lacking because
the covenantee had no title to the benefited land for the reason that he
was, as the court pointed out, a mortgagor with only an equitable in-
terest in the land. The statement of the court was therefore pure dicta.
There was moreover no supporting authority for the statement.
The assumption by some textwriters that a coveyance of land to
be burdened by a restrictive covenant satisfies the requirement of privity
necessary to enable the covenant to run at law rests on tenuous authority.
In several states decisions upholding the running of covenants merely
refer to the fact that the restriction was in a deed of conveyance. 41
Sometimes the decisions in which such references appear are based on
the presence of an easement,42 or on the presence of both an easement
and a deed containing the restriction.43 Where there is an easement,
the statement regarding the necessity of a deed is of course pure dicta.
Even in the absence of an easement, it is one thing to assume that privity
by deed is required, and quite another thing to deny relief because of
the absence of privity. Only in the latter situation would the absence
of privity by deed be the reason for the decision. In suits for equitable
41. In seven states-Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Wisconsin-there are dicta in cases in which the restrictions appeared
solely in deeds. Reidsville & S.E.R.R. v. Baxter, 13 Ga. App. 357, 79 S.E. 187 (1913);
Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N.W. 941 (1907); City of Iola v. Lyle, 164
Kan. 53, 187 P.2d 378 (1948); Mueller v. Banker Trust Co., 262 Mich. 54, 247 N.W.
103 (1933); Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N.H. 475 (1869); Herring v. Wallace Lumber
Co., 163 N.C. 481, 79 S.E. 876 (1916); Wooliscroft v. Norton, 15 Wis. 217 (1862).
The significance of the dictum in Burbank v. Pillsbury, supra, is weakened by the
subsequent decision in that state of Pratte v. Balatos, 99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492
(1959), which applied the doctrine of running covenants to chattels, where neither
transfer by deed nor an easement can be involved.
42. In four states--Georgia, Kansas, Nebraska and Pennsylvania-there are
dicta in decisions which are based on the presence of an easement: A.K. Ry. v.
McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 53 S.E. 701 (1906); Southworth v. Perring, 71 Kan. 755,
82 P. 785 (1905); Nebraska Loyal Mystic Legion v. Jones, 73 Neb. 342, 102 N.W. 621
(1905); Bald Eagle R.R. v. Nittany Valley R.R., 17 Pa. St. 284, 33 A. 239 (1895).
But note the weak effect of the dicta in view of the prior decision in Horn v. Miller,
136 Pa. St. 640, 20 A. 706 (1890), dispensing with privity.
43. In three states-Georgia, Indiana and Wisconsin-there are dicta in cases in
which there was both a deed and an easement. Georgia S. R.R. v. Reeves, 64 Ga. 492
(1880); Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488 (1881); Crawford v. Witherbee, 77 Wis. 419,
46 N.W. 545 (1899).
In Smith v. Kelley, 56 Me. 64 (1868), the dictum appears in a case in which
the covenant was construed as personal.
Dicta of current significance requiring privity by deed are to be found in 11 states:
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Oklahoma, Georgia, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Tennessee,
Nebraska, Indiana and Maine. In these states there have been no holdings on the
question of whether privity by deed will provide the basis for the running of the cove-
nant at law.
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enforcement the requirement of privity has been discarded in 12
states-Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Maryland, Missouri, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and, by statute,
in California.4 No case has been found in which equitable enforcement
has been denied because of the absence of privity. In actions for
damages the requirement of privity has been eliminated in six states-
in Illinois, New York and Pennsylvania by judicial decision, in Minne-
sota and New Mexico by strong dicta, and in California by judicial in-
terpretation of a statute.45 In seven states-Missouri, Nevada, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia and Wyoming-the requirement
of privity has been retained in actions for damages4" in actual holdings
or, in Nevada, by explicit dicta. In all seven states except Rhode Island
the requirement of privity has been found to be satisfied by a convey-
ance. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, which accepts the require-
ment of privity in actions for damages, rejects the doctrine of privity
by deed.47  The requirement of privity has been eliminated both at law
and in equity in New York48 and California.49  In Missouri, Oregon and
44. Jabeles & Colias Confectionary Co. v. Brown, 147 Ala. 593, 41 So. 626
(1906); Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal. 46, 269 P. 660 (1928) (pursuant to CAL. CiV. CODE
§ 1486); Twin Lakes Improvement Ass'n v. East Greenacres Irrigation Dist., 90
Ida. 281, 409 P.2d 390 (1965); Haslett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488 (1881); Meade v.
Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 A. 330 (1912); Ericksen v. Tapert, 172 Mich. 457, 138
N.W. 330 (1912); Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. 498 (1885); Brewer v. Marshall, 19 N.J.
Eq. 537 (1868) (Beasley, C.J.); Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440
(1877); Fitzstephens v. Watson, 344 P.2d 221 (Ore. 1959); Town of Middletown v.
Newport Hosp., 16 R.I. 319, 15 A. 800 (1888); Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. v. Seattle
Constr. Co., 102 Wash. 608, 173 P. 508 (1918).
45. Miller & Lux, Inc. v. San Joaquin Agricultural Co., 58 Cal. App. 753, 209
P. 592 (1922) (by statute); Roche v. Ullman, 104 Ill. 11 (1882); Shaber v. St. Paul
Water Co., 30 Minn. 179, 183, 14 N.W. 874, 875 (1883) (explicit dicta as to the run-
ning of the burden); Pillsbury v. Morris, 54 Minn. 492, 56 N.W. 170 (1893); Bolles v.
Pecos Irrigation Co., 23 N.M. 32, 38, 167 P. 280, 283 (1917) (strong dictum); Nepon-
sit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d
793 (1938); Trustees of Columbia College v. Thatcher, 87 N.Y. 311, 319 (1882) (dic-
tum); Horn v. Miller, 136 Pa. St. 640, 20 A.2d 706 (1890).
46. Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. 498 (1885); Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204
(1871); Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Ore. 185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959); Town of Middle-
town v. Newport Hosp., 16 R.I. 319, 15 A. 800 (1888); Panhandle & S.F. Ry. v. Wiggins,
161 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence Boom & Mfg. Co.,
53 W. Va. 87, 44 S.E. 520 (1903); Lingle Water Users Co. v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 43 Wyo. 41, 297 P. 385 (1931).
47. Town of Middletown v. Newport Hosp., 16 R.I. 319, 327, 15 A. 800, 803
(1888)
48. Trustees of Columbia College v. Thatcher, 87 N.Y. 311 (1882) (privity
eliminated in equity); Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877)
(privity eliminated at law).
49. Miller & Lux Inc. v. San Joaquin Agricultural Co., 58 Cal. App. 753, 209 P.
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Rhode Island privity is dispensed with in equity but is required at law. 0
In Massachusetts mutual and continuing privity in the form of an ease-
ment or other property interest beside that created by the covenant
itself is required.51 Privity of estate has thus been dispensed with in
actions for damages in six states. In seven states privity of estate is re-
quired in such actions. Six states have found privity in the act of con-
veyance of property by a deed in which the restriction was incorporated.
Authority is unanimous in eliminating the requirement of privity in
equity. In actions at law the authorities are about equally divided, and
too sparse to provide any controlling weight of authority.
3. Privity at Law and in Equity
Is there a distinction as to the requirement of privity at law and in
equity? That privity is required at law and not in equity has been
assumed by many authorities.52 The discarding of the requirement of
privity in suits for equitable relief has been explained on precisely op-
posite grounds. Stone explains the distinction on the ground that the
rule dispensing with privity rests on the doctrine of protection of the re-
striction in equity as a contractual right.53 Reno explains the distinction
on the ground that the covenant itself is recognized in equity as a
property interest and establishes a mutual and continuing interest in the
burdened property which makes other privity unnecessary in suits for
equitable relief.54 Pomeroy has a still different explanation of the dis-
tinction: that equity enforces the promise when the common law for any
technical reason does not.55 The same explanation has been advanced
by Jessel., M.R.,5 6 in two decisions. The problem of whether privity is a
prerequisite to enforcement of a restrictive covenant is not, however, a
technicality, such as, for example, the form in which the covenant is ex-
592 (1922) (privity eliminated at law); Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal. 46, 269 P. 660 (1928)
(privity eliminated in equity).
50. Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. 498 (1885); Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Ore.
185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959); Town of Middletown v. Newport Hosp., 16 R.I. 319, 15 A.
800 (1888).
51. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
52. 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1295 (5th ed. 1941); Ames, Spe-
cific Performance For and Against Strangers of a Contract, 17 HIv. L. REv. 174,
177 (1904); Reno, Equitable Servitudes in Land: Part 1, 28 VA. L. Rnv. 951, 972-73
nn. 74-77 (1942); Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Con-
tract, 18 COLUM. L. Rnv. 291, 297 (1918).
53. Stone, supra note 52, at 306.
54. Reno, supra note 52, at 976; see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.26
(AJ. Casner ed. 1952); Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, Equity, 33 HIv.
L. REv. 813, 814 (1920).
55. POMEROY, supra note 52, §§ 689, 1295, 1342.
56. See London & S.W. Ry. v. Gomm, L.R. 20 Ch. D. 562, 582-83 (1880).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
pressed, a circumstance which equity might disregard. It is a question of
substantive policy, turning on the relative weight to be attributed to the
effect of the restriction as aiding the development of land, and its effect
on impairing alienability. If informally created restrictions were to be
recognized only in equity, they could be enforced in the absence of
proof of damage, in the exclusive equitable jurisdiction.5 7 If a covenant
which runs with the land at law were to be enforced specifically, this
could be only on the ground that damages would not constitute an ade-
quate remedy. In the one case the absence of a legal remedy would be
irrelevant. In the other, this circumstance would be the crucial factor
in determining the right to equitable relief. This anomalous result is a
typical illustration of what we have tried to eliminate by abolishing the
separate court of equity. The same agreement should no longer create
two kinds of obligations, depending on the form of the agreement; one
obligation which binds the defendant to pay damages, the other only to
abstain from the proscribed use of the land. In the United States it is
only in Missouri, Oregon and Rhode Island that a distinction has been
explicitly drawn between enforcement at law and in equity with respect
to privity. Since privity by deed is not privity in reality, because the
grantor and the grantee cannot both be the owners of the land at the
same time, 8 even at the moment of delivery of the deed, it is unlikely
that the requirement of privity by deed will be adopted in the uncom-
mitted states. It remains to be seen whether in Alabama, Maryland,
Michigan, New Jersey and Washington, states in which privity by deed
has been dispensed with thus far only in equity, the requirement will be
retained in actions for damages. Except in Oregon, no state has recog-
nized the requirement of privity by deed within the past 27 years.
Owners of different parcels of land can create easements by agree-
ment, but restrictions on the use of land are not included in this category
of property interests. In agreements between landowners restricting the
use of property the burden and benefit are placed on their respective
properties, just as in easements, but these interests are differently classi-
fied. The law should attach no different results to restrictions which
do not fall within the traditional category of easements. The difference
between easements, which run with the land, and restrictions on the use
of land, is so thin as to be purely arbitrary. Sometimes the factual situ-
ations overlap.59 If a right of way or a party wall constitutes the neces-
57. POMEROY, supra note 52, § 1342.
58. Lord Brougham said in Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1048 (Ch.
1834), that there is no privity of estate in a transfer by deed.
59. Covenants were held to constitute property interests in the nature of ease-
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sary connection to enable the interests to run, then any useful restriction,
for example one to confine construction to private homes, should be
given the same effect. Restrictions created by agreement between land-
owners give rise to mutual interests in the burdened property, and should
run with the land just as do restrictions which fall into the category of
easements of the traditional kind. This is the effect which is given in
England to restrictive covenants under the formula that the covenant
creates a property interest running, not with an estate in the land, but
with the servient property itself. 60
The assumption that privity by deed is dispensed with only in
equity is thus no better supported by either reason or authority than the
assumption that privity by deed is necessary at law. In a closely analo-
gous situation both Lord Brougham61 and Lord Eldon62 have urged
that no equitable charge should be allowed which would not have been
a legal charge if properly created. The assumption of a difference in
the treatment of privity in equity and at law reflects an outmoded duality
of approach to law and equity. To say that privity is required at law
but is dispensed with in equity is merely to describe the jural phenome-
non, not to state a reason for the disparity based on the nature of the
remedy which is sought. If it is so unfair for a subsequent acquirer,
other than a bona fide purchaser, to violate the restriction, that the ab-
sence of privity will not constitute a bar to injunctive relief, it would
seem to be equally unfair when the plaintiff seeks relief in damages.
The moral basis of the equity doctrine is sound; but in modem times
moral sensitivity is no longer considered to be an attribute possessed by
a judge only when he is asked to grant an equitable remedy. There is
no reason historically, logically or from the viewpoint of social utility
why the restriction, if it is to run in equity, should not run under the
same circumstances at law; why it must, if it is to run at law, be based
on privity of estate; still less, why the running at law should rest on an
assumed privity which is not privity in fact.
ments in State v. Mulloy, 332 Mo. 1107, 61 S.W.2d 741 (1933), and in Porter v. John-
son, 232 Mo. App. 1150, 115 S.W.2d 529 (Kansas City, Mo. Ct. App. 1938). In
Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Ore. 185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959), an "easement deed" from
one landowner to another from whom he had recently purchased the property was held
to have created both an easement to draw water from a reservoir, and a covenant to
maintain the reservoir and a pipeline for furnishing water. In Farmers High Line &
Reservoir Co. v. New Hampshire Real Estate Co., 40 Colo. 467, 92 P. 290 (1907),
an agreement between landowners to provide water for irrigation was held to have
created an easement and a covenant.
60. CHEsHn, supra note 18, at 550.
61. Keppetl v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1053 (Ch. 1834).
62. Duke of Bedford v. Trustees of British Museum, 39 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1059-62
(Ch. 1882).
B. The Relationship of the Restriction to the Land
Another type of control against the spread of restrictions required
that the covenant must be closely related to the land which it affects.
As to circumstances in which the benefits and burdens are permitted
to run, Spencer's Case,6 3 decided in 1583, a case involving the running
of covenants in a lease, required that covenants must touch or concern
the land. This indefinite formula has given rise to endless interpreta-
tion and criticism. No attempt at closer definition was made in the
case, and it is open to question whether the covenant to pay rent, the
principal kind of covenant contemplated by chapter 34 of 32 Henry
VIII, enacted 43 years before, did not itself fail to meet the test,
since such a covenant does not affect the land directly. Since the
decision in Spencer's Case, the requirement has been greatly relaxed
in both England and the United States. In England it has been sufficient
since 1925 that the agreement relate to the land.64 In the United States,
Clark65 and Powell66 accept the test proposed by Bigelow,6 7 that the
promisor's legal interest as owner is rendered less valuable, or the
promisee's legal interest as owner rendered more valuable, because of the
promise. Section 1468 of the California Civil Code provides that for a
covenant to run, it must be to do or to refrain from doing some act on the
land. Covenants not to compete are held to come within all the usual
tests.6 The requirement of relationship to the land makes requirement
of privity in any form unnecessary as a control.
As in applying the requirement of privity, the Restatement of Pro-
perty makes a distinction, depending on whether the running of the
burden or of the benefit is involved, in the required relationship of the
covenant to the land. Section 537 requires, for the burden to run, that
the promise must benefit the promisee in the physical use or enjoyment
of the land possessed by him or that the consummation of the transac-
tion of which the promise was a part will benefit the promisor in the
physical use or enjoyment of the land he possesses. For the benefit
to run, section 543 requires that the promise must be in respect to the
use of the land by the promisee either by constituting an advantage in the
use of his land in a physical sense, or by decreasing the commercial
competition in his use of it, or by constituting a return to him of the
63. 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
64. Law of Property Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 78.
65. CLARK, supra note 8, at 93.
66. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY f 675 (recomp. ed. 1968).
67. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L. REV. 639 (1914).
68. National Union Bank v. Segur, 39 N.J.L. (10 Vroom) 173 (1877).
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price for a use of the land by the promisor. The provision that a promise
which decreases the commercial competition will suffice for the running
of the benefit, a provision which does not appear in Section 537, deal-
ing with the running of the burden, relaxes the required relationship of
the covenant to the land to this extent. The requirement of section 543,
comment (f), that the covenant, for the benefit to run, "must make the
use more satisfactory to his physical senses" is relaxed, in the case of the
running of the benefits, to include covenants which restrict competition
in the use of the land.
C. The Necessity that the Restriction Affect Land
In a few states equitable servitudes in chattels attached to a busi-
ness are recognized, because the chattels have acquired "the smell of
the soil.'509 No jurisdiction has extended the doctrine of legal covenants
to chattels, possibly because of the difficulty of determining the existence
of the restrictions, since the recording acts do not apply to chattels. It
is incongruous for the law to reach different results depending on the
way the restriction is to be enforced. Either equity has gone too far in
recognizing the running of restrictions on chattels, or the law has not
gone far enough.
D. The Necessity of a Writing
The word "covenant" meant originally a written contract under
seal.70 Both deeds and agreements between landowners are covenants
if the necessary formal requirements are met. With the elimination in
almost all states of the requirement of a seal,7 1 this leaves as the only dif-
ferences in the manner of creation of covenants running with the land
at law, and equitable servitudes, the need for a writing,72 and in a few
states, in the absence of a continuing privity of the tenurial kind, privity
in the form of a deed. Restrictions affecting the use of land are com-
monly found in deeds, in both England and the United States, and
equitable servitudes created otherwise than by deed are rare. The re-
69. Pratt v. Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430, 13 A.2d 492 (1955); see Chafee, Equitable
Servitudes in Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REv. 945 (1928); Chafee, The Music Goes Round
and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARv. L. Rav. 1250 (1956); Fratcher,
Restraints on Alienation of Legal Interests in Michigan Property: Ii, 50 MIcH. L.
REV. 10, 17 (1952); see also National Phonograph Co. v. Menck, [1911] A.C. 336
(P.C.) (equitable servitude applied to patent); DeMattos v. Gibson, 45 Eng. Rep. 108
(Ch. 1859) (equitable doctrine applied to a ship).
70. TFFANY, supra note 6, § 848.
71. 5 POWELL, supra note 66, 1 672.
72. TWFANY, supra note 6, § 848.
quirement of a writing in the case of covenants creating or transferring
interests in real property arises from the provisions of the Statute of
Frauds," compliance with which may be excused when enforcement of
an equitable nature is sought. To establish a personal right to damages
there must be in some states a conveyance, and where this is required,
a deed is necessary because of the requirement of the law of property in
addition to the requirement of the Statute of Frauds. The absence in
other states of any requirement of privity enables restrictions to be
created orally7 4 or by implied agreement. 5 Servitudes can even arise
from the outward appearance of a tract of land which is being devel-
oped.76 In some jurisdictions the absence of the requirement of a writ-
ing is explained on the ground that restrictions originate in contract.77
The provision of the Statute of Frauds requiring contracts which need
not be performed within a year to be in writing7 8 is not applied in some
jurisdictions because the servitudes terminate with a change in the char-
acter of the neighborhood, which may happen within a year.79 In those
jurisdictions equitable restrictions need not be in writing to comply
with the Statute of Frauds. Thus a servitude, although it is an interest
in land, can be created otherwise than by deed because it originates in
contract. The equitable enforcement of restrictions which have been
created informally is possible even in states which require privity by
conveyance where enforcement is sought in damages. The fact that
equitable servitudes can be created informally is considered by Pound
to be the distinctive feature of the doctrine, which constitutes, in his
words, "an equitable appendage to the common law as to servitudes." 80
There are, however, jurisdictions which require that the restrictions must,
like other interests in land, be in writing.8'
73. 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 3 (1677).
74. See Thornton v. Schobe, 79 Colo. 25, 243 P. 617 (1925); CLARK, supra note
8, at 178; TIFFANY, supra note 6, § 860.
75. TIFFANY, supra note 6, § 860 n.54; Sims, supra note 5, at 27-28.
76. Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N.Y. 105 (1862); Pound, The Progress of
the Law, 1918-1919, Equity, 33 HA v. L. REV. 813, 816 (1920).
77. Reno, Equitable Servitudes in Land: Part 1, 28 VA. L. REv. 951, 966 (1942).
78. 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4(5) (1677).
79. E.g., Isaacs v. Schmuck, 245 N.Y. 77, 156 N.E. 621 (1927); Bull v. Burton,
227 N.Y. 101, 124 N.E. 111 (1919); Amerman v. Deane, 132 N.Y. 36, 75 N.E. 961
(1904); Trustees of Columbia College v. Thatcher, 87 N.Y. 311 (1882); Trustees of
Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877); see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 9.22 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); CLARK, supra note 3, at 174, 184 n.60; TIFFANY, supra
note 6, § 875; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 564 (1944); Pound, supra note 76, at
819, 821.
80. Pound, supra note 76, at 814.
81. Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 A. 245 (1928); Flynn v. N.Y., W. &
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If one of the functions of a conveyance, which requires a deed, is
to establish a relationship between the covenantor and the covenantee
with respect to the land, such a relationship can be created by agree-
ment without a deed. The problem of the creation of restrictions apart
from a conveyance arises in two situations; in agreements among land-
owners, and in enforcement between landowners of restrictions imposed
by a common grantor who has failed to incorporate the restriction in
each deed. The requirement of a writing is arguable. The reason why
this requirement is eliminated in equity in various situations is the ex-
treme hardship that would result if the requirement of a writing were
to be enforced, for example where there has been substantial change in
position in reliance on an oral contract. In restrictions on the use of
land no such hardship ordinarily exists. There is however some justifi-
cation for equity to relax the requirement of a writing in comparatively
infrequent situations, such as oral agreements among landowners for
restrictions on the use of their land. In the far more common situation,
where the restriction is incorporated in the conveyance, it will always
be in a deed. It is probably because restrictions are usually found in
deeds conveying interests in fee that it has been thought by American
textwriters that the succession of ownership of the burdened property
from the covenantee to the covenantor is sufficient to support the run-
ning of obligations in personam. s2 If the circumstances justify the en-
forcement of a restriction made by agreement between landowners,
there is no reason why enforcement should be denied because the re-
striction was not contained in a deed conveying a fee.
II. Problems Connected with the Enforcement of Restrictions
A. Enforcement in Damages
What we mean when we say that a covenant runs at law is that there
is a right to damages for breach of the covenant. In seven states it is
only when privity is present that restrictions are enforceable in
damages.8 3  In most cases damages would be only nominal,8 4 and such
actions are infrequent. In six states restrictions are enforceable in
damages even when they were created by agreement between land-
owners and no privity existed. s5 In all states where the question has
B.R.R., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913 (1916); Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133
N.W. 317 (1911); CLARK, supra note 8, at 178 n.33; TIFFANY, supra note 6, § 858.
82. Sims, supra note 5, at 3 n.190.
83. See cases cited note 46 supra.
84. See, e.g., Fourth Presbyterian Church v. Steiner, 86 App. Div. (79 Hun) 314,
318, 29 N.Y.S. 488, 490 (1894).
85. See cases cited note 45 supra.
arisen restrictions are enforceable in equity even in the absence of priv-
ity.5 6 One might speculate as to the possible effect of the absence,
when the doctrine originated, of a recording system, on the establish-
ment of a rule limiting the running of covenants to those contained in
conveyances, since this limitation narrowed the title search to inquiry
from former owners in the chain of title. The difference in remedy is of
practical significance only in affirmative restrictions, where damages
can be more readily computed. Negative restrictions, which comprise
by far the largest number of restrictions, are almost invariably enforced
by injunction, since the purpose of the restriction is to preserve the value
of all the property in the development against impairment from any
source. The personal obligation created in conveyances is limited to
owners at the time of the breach. 87 It seems not unlikely that under-
lying the insistence in a few states that enforcement in damages is to be
limited to restrictions in conveyances is the feeling that controls must
be established because damages, if collectible from a remote owner at
some later time, may soar to an amount which would cause extreme
hardship to the current owner when the breach occurs. The problem
could be handled, however, including liability resulting from a breach
of an agreement between landowners, in the same way as in the compu-
tation of damages for breach of covenants of title.18  The most anoma-
lous feature of the theory which limits the right to enforcement in
damages to cases in which the obligation was created by conveyance, is
the refusal in several states to recognize that any right to damages can
arise out of the tortious interference with the property right of the cov-
enantee or his successors in interest; that is, the right in rem. Such a
remedy is available if, for example, the owner of an easement is ex-
cluded from its use. 89 There is as much reason for imposing a running
personal obligation in agreements between landowners as in covenants
in deeds conveying title. The language of the restriction is the same
in each situation, and the purpose in each situation is identical. This
intention fails, however, in some states, unless it has been expressed in
connection with the conveyance of a fee, so as to establish the relation-
ship thought to be necessary to enable the personal obligation to run.
The right to damages for violation of the property interest created by
86. See cases cited note 44 supra.
87. 5 POWELL, supra note 66, 680 nn.6-7; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 9.5, 9.18 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); Ames, Specific Performance For and Against
Strangers to the Contract, 17 HARV. L. REV. 174, 178 (1904).
88. See Hunt v. Hay, 214 N.Y. 578, 108 N.E. 851 (1915); Pitcher v. Livingston,
4 Johns. 1, 18 (N.Y. 1809) (Kent, C.J.).
89. Tide-Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 A. 351 (1924).
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the restriction has been recognized in other states in actions between
landowners,90 where there is no privity except that created by the agree-
ment itself.
If the additional control over the proliferation of restrictions pro-
vided by the requirement of privity is desirable in order to prevent the
running of the obligation to pay damages for breach of the covenant,
it is equally desirable in order to prevent the running of the obliga-
tion in rem; but since almost all restrictions are created in connection
with conveyances, the requirement is of no practical utility. Clark,91
Pound 2 and Sims9" feel that there should be enforcement in damages
even in the absence of privity. In cases of interference with easements,
damages are granted as a matter of course.94 That the restriction was
created otherwise than by a deed of conveyance should lead to no dif-
ferent result than when it was created in the course of a conveyance. It
has been held in only six states, however, that damages are obtainable
where the restriction was created by agreement between landowners.9"
There is also an important dictum of Lindley, L.J., indicating that such
damages might be granted in an appropriate case.9 The recognition
of a right to damages would eliminate the only important difference in
the consequences attaching to restrictions depending on the manner
in which they were created.
1. The Necessity of Benefit Appurtenant in Enforcement in Damages
There are scattered decisions to the effect that in covenants which
run with the land at law the benefit is not tied to ownership of land,
and runs in gross. 97  Servitudes cannot run in gross98 except in New
York.99 If the distinction can be rationalized, it may rest on the re-
90. See cases cited note 45 supra.
91. CLARK, supra note 8, at 116, 128.
92. See R. PoUND, THE SPnuT OF THE COMMON LAw 23 (1921).
93. Sims, supra note 5, at 33.
94. See, e.g., Tide-Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 A. 351 (1924).
95. See cases cited note 45 supra.
96. Hall v. Erwin, 37 Ch. D. 74, 80 (Lindley, L.J., 1887), answering argu-
ment of Warmington, Q.C.: "He has not used the property in violation of the cove-
nant." Id. at 77.
97. Bald Eagle Valley R.R. v. Nittany Valley R.R., 171 Pa. St. 284, 33 A. 239
(1895).
98. In equity the plaintiff must own land in the neighborhood. Los Angeles
University v. Swarth, 107 F. 798 (9th Cir. 1901); Forman v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
114 Md. 574, 80 A. 298 (1911); Formby v. Barker, [1903] 2 Ch. 539 (alternative hold-
ing); see REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 550, comment c at 3275-76 (1944). Contra,
Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913), criticised in 9 ILL. L. REV. 58
(1916); TIFFANY, supra note 6, § 864, at 495.
99. Lewis v. Golner, 129 N.Y. 227, 29 N.E. 81 (1891).
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luctance of equity to enforce agreements if no useful purpose will be
served; that is, only where the benefit accrues to the plaintiff by reason
of his ownership of benefited land.
B. Specific Enforcement
When the remedy of enforcement in damages is inadequate, re-
strictions which run with the land at law are enforceable by injunction
to restrain their violation. When there is no personal obligation, the
absence of damage is immaterial. In jurisdictions in which restrictions
are not enforceable in damages because of the absence of privity of
estate, they are enforceable only by injunction or by a decree for specific
performance. The distinction has been attributed to a different ap-
proach to the nature of the restriction at law and in equity. If enforce-
ment between remote parties rests on contract principles, the right to
damages arises. If it rests on ownership of a property interest, there is
no right to damages for breach of contract, the obligation of which might
attach to the owner of the burdened property; there is only a property in-
terest,100 protected against violation in equity, but which gives no right
of a contractual nature to damages. It will be seen that this explana-
tion of the distinction rests on a theory of the nature of the restriction
exactly the opposite of the theory which supports the running of the
burdens in equity without other form of privity.' 01 Distinguished schol-
ars have reached opposite conclusions as to whether restrictions on the
use of land rest on contract or on interests in property. 102 Stone, who
favors the contractual explanation, has said that "[a]ll so-called equit-
able 'easements' or 'servitudes' have their origin in contract, expressed
or implied, and their nature and extent depends upon the extent to which
equity will compel compliance with the contract . . . by and for third
persons whose acts or omissions may in some way affect the rights
100. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.26 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); see Reno,
Equitable Servitudes in Land: Part 1, 28 VA. L. REV. 951, 976 (1942).
101. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
102. The following authorities favor the contract theory: TIFFANY, supra note 6,
§ 861; Ames, Specific Performance For and Against Strangers to the Contract, 17
HARv. L. REV. 174, 177-79 (1908); Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities to
Strangers to a Contract, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 294-96 (1918).
The following authorities favor the property interest theory: CLARK, supra note 8,
at 175; G. CLARK, EQUITY § 96 (1924); Burby, Land Burdens in California: Equita-
ble Land Burdens, 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 281, 286-87 (1937); Clark, Equitable Servitudes,
16 MICH. L. REV. 90, 92-93 (1917); Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919,
Equity, 33 HARv. L. REV. 813 (1920); Walsh, Equitable Easements and Restrictions,
2 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 234 (1930). Powell feels the contract theory is no longer ade-
quate. POWELL, supra note 66, 671.
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acquired by the covenant or contract creating the servitude."' 3 Ames,
who also adopts the contractual explanation, states that the equitable
relief is concurrent with the legal remedy in covenants that run at law.
In agreements, whether under seal or by parol, enforceable at law only
between the immediate parties, the jurisdiction of equity in favor of or
against third parties is exclusive. 104 Clark, although he favors the real
property explanation, has pointed out that an action for damages will
lie, if specific performance is not possible, against subsequent acquirers,
under the contract theory, although not under the property interest
theory. 05 We may conclude from these statements that the term
"equitable servitude," whether regarded as an outgrowth of contract or
as a property interest, is a symbolic expression of the obligation to honor
a restriction on the use of land, however created, by a decree for specific
enforcement, as in cases of interference with easements. The question
has never been answered satisfactorily, or even raised except by Judge
Clark,' -0 6 why the reasons for granting equitable relief in the enforce-
ment of restrictions created by agreement between landowners are not
equally relevant with regard to granting relief in damages, or why the
reasons for granting relief in damages in the enforcement of restric-
tions created by deeds conveying the property are not equally relevant
in the enforcement of restrictions created by agreement between land-
owners.
IH. Similarities in the Principles Governing the Enforcement
of Covenants Running with the Land and
Equitable Servitudes
A. Running of the Burden
Under conditions deemed appropriate in each state, the burden of a
restrictive covenant runs both at law and in equity.'0 In the United
States the great weight of authority enforces affirmative obligations. 08
There is a sharp division of authority between England and the United
States on the question of whether a distinction should be drawn in the
103. Stone, supra note 102, at 294-95.
104. Ames, supra note 102, at 177.
105. See CLARK, supra note 8, at 172.
106. Id. at 209-10.
107. See TwrANY, supra note 6, § 859 n.46. Sims reports that up to 1944 there
was no distinction in the United States in the running of the benefits and burdens in
equitable restrictions or legal covenants in 28 states. Only New Jersey, New York,
Virginia and West Virginia held that the burdens could not run in covenants created
by deed, or where an easement existed. Sims, supra note 5, at 27.
108. TIFANY, supra note 6, § 859 n.46. See generally POWELL, supra note 66,
676-77.
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running of the benefits and burdens, or as to the circumstances under
which the benefits and burdens, respectively, may run. In England
only benefits run at law except in the relationship of landlord and
tenant, 109 although the burden of a negative covenant is enforced in
equity against subsequent acquirers other than bona fide purchasers. 110
In New York the former doctrine that only negative restrictions run with
the land either at law or in equity has been so qualified as to have become
almost obsolete."'
B. The Effect of Notice
At common law the absence of notice does not relieve subsequent
acquirers from liability in damages where the restriction has been
created in such form that the burden of the restrictions runs with the
land at law." 2 When the suit is for specific relief, in the case of either
covenants running with the land, or equitable servitudes, subsequent
bona fide purchasers will take free from restrictions of which they had
no knowledge; but it is impossible to see why the result should not be
the same with regard to liability in damages. Agreements between
neighboring landowners or unilateral declarations of restrictions must
in most states be recorded, as instruments relating to or affecting the title
to real property,113 and their record therefore gives notice to subsequent
grantees of the burdened property. Restrictive agreements, whether
created informally or formally, are recordable if they are in writing, as
almost all of them are. The effect of the recording acts is to give notice
to later acquirers of the burdened property if the instrument is recorded,
and in states where the search must extend to deeds from the common
109. CHESHIRE, supra note 18, at 534-37.
110. Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). In England only negative
restrictions run. Haywood v. Brunswick Permanent Bldg. Soc'y, 8 Q.B.D. 403 (1881).
111. Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913), where the court held
that affirmative covenants will not be enforced; this has been drastically modified by
later decisions. Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d
832, 196 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1959); Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus.
Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
New York has explicitly recognized many exceptions to the general rule laid down
in Miller v. Clary, supra. E.g., Morgan Lake Co. v. New York, N.H. & H. Ry., 262
N.Y. 234, 186 N.E. 685 (1938); Morehouse v. Woodruff, 218 N.Y. 494, 113 N.E. 512
(1916).
112. TIFFANY, supra note 6, § 850; Abbott, Covenants in a Lease Which Run
with the Land, 31 YALE L.J. 127, 131 (1921).
113. Bogan v. Saunders, 71 F. Supp. 587 (D.D.C. 1947); Wayt v. Patee, 205
Cal. 46, 269 P. 660 (1928); Wootton v. Seltzer, 83 N.J.E. 163, 90 A. 701 (1914);
TwFANY, supra note 6, § 863 n.94.
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grantor,114 to deny effect to the prior instrument if it was not recorded,
thus obliterating any practical distinction as to the effect of notice in
covenants running with the land and in equitable servitudes. The dis-
tinction is still of significance in jurisdictions where the title search need
not be extended to the contents of prior deeds from a common
grantor. 115 The danger that subsequent purchasers might not be aware
of restrictions in prior deeds, where the developer neglects to incor-
porate similar restrictions in later deeds," 6 and where the obligation
of the title searcher extends only to instruments in the direct chain of
title, can be easily avoided by insistence that the developer follow a
simple procedure. Where a tract index is in effect, a plan of the pro-
posed development should be recorded against the entire tract, which
would give notice to all purchasers by placing the restriction in the direct
chain of title to each lot in the tract. A prudent purchaser of a lot could
easily insist that such a method be followed. Another method, and
one which would be effective even in a jurisdiction where there is no
tract index, would be to make a conveyance of the entire tract to a straw
man by a deed containing the restrictions, followed by a reconveyance
of all except a single lot, to prevent a merger, placing the restrictions in
the direct chain of title of each lot subsequently sold. The remaining lot
could be sold separately. This method would give reciprocal effect to
114. Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 A. 508 (1927); Finley v. Glenn, 303
Pa. 131, 154 A. 299 (1931); W. WALSH, REAL PROPERTY § 312, at 675 n.17 (1930);
McDougal, Summary of Answers to Property Questionnaire, AALS HANDBOOK oF
PROCEEDINGS 268, 276 (1941): "The growth of the doctrine of notice has rendered
practically obsolete the old common law doctrines of covenants." See Wool v. Scott,
140 Cal. App. 2d 835, 96 P.2d 17 (1956); McNeill v. Gary, D.C. App. 399 (1913);
Wiegman v. Kusel, 270 Ill. 520, 110 N.E. 885 (1915); Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678,
93 A. 216 (1915); Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925); King
v. Union Trust Co., 226 Mo. 351, 126 S.W. 515 (1910); Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C.
221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957); Jones v. Berg, 105 Wash. 69, 177 P. 712 (1919); Notting-
ham Patent Brick & Tile Co. v. Butler, [1883] 15 Q.B.D. 261, [1886] 16 Q.B.D. 632;
CLAK, supra note 8, at 183; TIFFANY, supra note 6, § 863; Note, 14 MIcH. L. REV.
119 (1915); 14 Am. Jun. CovENANTs, Reservations and, Conditions § 319 (1938).
20 AM. JUn. 2d Covenants, Reservations and Conditions § 309 nn.1-4 (1965) lists
Iowa, North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Massachusetts, Florida, Colorado, Kentucky,
Michigan and California as being in accord. In Annot., 16 A.L.R. 1013 nn. 6, 7, 9
(1922), it is stated that there was at that date some authority for the view, citing cases
from New Jersey, Minnesota, and North Carolina. See generally 21 CORNELL L.Q.
479 (1936).
115. E.g., Hancock v. Gumm, 151 Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872 (1921); Glorieux v.
Lighthipe, 88 NJ.L. (3 Gummere) 199, 96 A. 94 (1915); Academy of the Sacred
Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935); Hayslett v. Shell Petroleum
Corp., 38 Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888 (1930). See generally 21 CORNELL L.Q. 479
(1936).
116. See Hancock v. Gumm, 151 Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872 (1921).
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the restrictions between the various purchasers, regardless of the order
in which they purchase. The drastic limitation on the right to specific
enforcement of equitable servitudes or of covenants running with the
land at law established in Tulk v. Moxhay, in favor of purchasers in
good faith, has thus ceased to be significant, as a result of the record-
ing acts. The only qualifications to this result are in states in which the
obligation of title search extends only to instruments in the direct chain
of title and not to deeds of other property retained by the common
grantor. In such states the method of conveyance of the tract to a straw
man would be necessary.
C. Division of Authority as to Termination
The authorities are divided as to the effect of change in the charac-
ter of the neighborhood in terminating the obligation to pay damages for
breach of the covenant, or the in rem obligation attaching to the land.
Even where the personal right to damages remains to create a cloud on
the title, there is little likelihood of a judgment for a substantial
amount of damages, for the same reason that the change in the charac-
ter of the neighborhood defeats the right to specific protection of the
right created by the restriction. Since equity will not grant what are
regarded as its extraordinary remedies unless they serve a useful pur-
pose, equitable servitudes cannot be enforced specifically if the neigh-
borhood has changed to such an extent as to make the restrictions no
longer useful in preserving the general character of the development.
Since damages will still lie, however, in a few states, the personal obli-
gation of the successor in interest to the original promisee remains to
threaten violators with a lawsuit, and therefore the servitude remains
an encumbrance on the title, making it unmarketable.11 7
IV. A Comparison of the Doctrines of Creation and Enforcement
of Restrictions at Law and in Equity
The differences between covenants running with the land at law,
and equitable servitudes, are in the manner of their creation and in the
principles of law which are applied in actions for damages as distin-
guished from suits for specific relief. The fact that some equitable
modifications of early common law rules concerning restrictive cove-
117. Trustees of Columbia College v. Thatcher, 87 N.Y. 311 (1882) (no en-
forcement in equity); TIFFANY, supra note 6, § 875 nn.1, 6. Contra, at law, Bull v.
Burton, 227 N.Y. 101, 124 N.E. 111 (1919); Amerman v. Deane, 132 N.Y. 355, 30 N.E.
741 (1892); McClure v. Leaycroft, 183 N.Y. 36, 75 N.E. 961 (1904); Trustees of
Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877); see 4 J. POMEROY, EQUrrY JuRis-
PRUDENCE § 1295 (5th ed. 1941); Pound, supra note 102, at 821.
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nants have not been applied in actions for damages should cause no
surprise, as this phenomenon is not peculiar to the law of restrictive
covenants. What is surprising is the extent of the acceptance of equi-
table doctrines in actions for damages for breach of the covenant.
A. Similar Doctrines
Equitable doctrines which have been accepted, in the United
States, in the enforcement of covenants running with the land in dam-
ages are (1) the effect given to the running of burdens, even those
which require affirmative action by the owner of the burdened land;"1 "
(2) the relaxation of the requirement of a close connection between the
restriction and the land which is burdened; 19 (3) the protection, due
to the effect of the recording acts, of bona fide purchasers;1 20 (4) the
reciprocal enforcement of rights and obligations created by transfers of
lots in a tract which is being developed in a uniform manner,' 2' re-
gardless of the order of acquisition of the lots; 2 2 and (5) the relaxation
of the form in which the intention that restrictions referring to things
not in being must be expressed.' 23
B. Dissimilar Doctrines
The equitable doctrines which have not been adopted in covenants
running with the land when damages are sought are (1) the require-
ment that the benefit must be appurtenant124 and (2) the elimination of
the requirement of a writing. 25
C. Division of Authority
There is a fairly even division of authority (1) on the effect of
change in the character of the neighborhood in terminating the restric-
118. See text accompanying notes 107-11 supra.
119. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 112-15 supra.
121. Health Dep't v. Riggs, 252 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952); Doll v.
Moise, 214 Ky. 123, 282 S.W. 763 (1926).
122. Health Dep't v. Riggs, 252 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Ky. CL App. 1952); Schmidt
v. Palisade Supply Co., 84 A. 807 (NJ. Eq. 1912); Chesbro v. Moers, 233 N.Y. 75,
80, 134 N.E. 842, 843 (1922); Renals v. Cowlishaw, [1878J 9 Ch. D. 125, affd,
(1879J 11 Ch. D. 866.
123. The word "assigns" is no longer necessary. See Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa
357, 113 N.W. 941 (1907); Maher v. Union Stockyards Co., 55 Ohio App. 412, 9
N.E.2d 995 (1936); 2 AMEwPCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.10 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952);
Bordwell, English Property Reform and its American Aspects, 37 YALE L.J. 1, 25
(1927). A few states still adhere to the old rule. See 2 AMERCAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY, supra § 9.10 n.3.
124. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
125. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
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tion,12 6 (2) as to the application of restrictions to chattels,12 7 and (3) as
to the requirement of privity of estate in order to enable the restrictions
to run at law.128 On this question the great majority of states are uncom-
mitted.
Conclusion
Many of the problems which have created uncertainty in the doc-
trines which are applicable to restrictive covenants are due to the dis-
tinction between the personal and real relationships which are involved.
The most important differences are the elimination of the requirements
of a writing and of privity of estate between the parties to the covenant
when equitable enforcement is sought, and the limitation, in a few
states, of enforcement in damages to situations in which there is privity.
As a practical matter this method of enforcement is rare. In most of the
states which require privity for enforcement against remote parties in
damages, privity may be supplied by the incorporation of the restriction
in a deed conveying the property. Restrictions in covenants running
with the land at law are enforceable in damages against the covenantor
or his successors in ownership of the burdened land as long as they own
the property. In equitable servitudes there is no personal liability in
damages, and the enforcement of the obligation is only by injunction or
by a decree for specific performance against acquirers with notice or
who have not given value. The distinction as to the effect of notice is
largely eliminated by the recording acts. Restrictions created otherwise
than in writing are not enforced in damages but only by specific reme-
dies. When equitable relief is sought, both the requirement of a writing
and the requirement of privity are discarded. In some states a change
in the character of the neighborhood discharges the restriction in equity
but not at law.
"The so-called equitable restriction," as Justice Loring has pointed
out, "results from the fact that equity will enforce the agreement against
those taking with notice in favor of the then owner of the land to be
benefited. Equity does not enforce the agreement because there is an
equitable restriction.' ' 29  The recognition, already extended in some
states, of a right to damages for violation of the property interest created
by the restriction, corresponding to the remedy if the owner of an ease-
ment is excluded from its use, 3 ' would remove the only substantial dis-
126. See note 117 & accompanying text supra.
127. See generally Chafee, Equitable Servitudes in Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV.
945 (1928); Chafee, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and
Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1956).
128. See cases cited notes 45-46 supra.
129. Bailey v. Agawam Nat'l Bank, 190 Mass. 20, 23-24, 76 N.E. 449, 451 (1906).
130. See Tide-Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 A. 351 (1924).
1344 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
May 1970J COVENANTS AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 1345
crepancy in the remedies available to enforce restrictions whether cre-
ated in writing or otherwise.
Whether the restriction is affirmative or negative, or created in writ-
ing or orally, the doctrinal basis for enabling the personal obligation to
run can be supplied by regarding restrictions as property rights in the
affected property. The benefit of the restrictions to large segments of
the community justifies the relaxation of controls which might have
the effect of limiting the proliferation of such restrictions. 131 It is un-
likely that the equitable doctrine eliminating the requirement of privity
of estate will be rejected in the uncommitted states in actions for dam-
ages. The further result of a complete harmonization of the rules allow-
ing recovery in damages with the rules governing specific enforcement
may reasonably be anticipated.
Roger Traynor, retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, has likened outmoded principles to a tortoise whose progress is
slowed by the weight of accumulated incrustations. There is no reason
except the dead weight of history which prevents the fusion, in this area
of law, of equitable doctrine into the principles which govern the enforce-
ment of restrictions in damages, nor for preserving the dual classification
of restrictions on the use of land. We do not classify contracts in differ-
ent categories according to whether they are enforceable specifically or in
damages; nor do we classify separately leases for a year or less from
those for a longer period because one kind of lease must be in writing.
The obligation to pay damages for breach of a restriction should be
recognized in restrictions which are created informally and therefore are
treated as enforceable only by injunction or decrees for specific perform-
ance. It is to be hoped that the application of equitable doctrine in the
enforcement of restrictions, whether in damages or specifically, will soon
be uniform. The peak of the mountain is already in sight of those
who explore the paths of covenants running with the land at law, and
equitable servitudes. When the paths finally converge, it will be at the
peak of the same mountain.
131. In Morland v. Cook, L.R. 6 Eq. 252, 266 (Ch. 1868), Romilly, M.R. drew
the distinction between a covenant which is merely a burden, and one which provides
for a corresponding advantage. The effect on curbing excessive proliferation is dis-
cussed in Brewer v. Marchell, 18 N.J. Eq. 337, afl'd 19 N.J. Eq. 537 (1868).

